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Abstract
Nowadays, Deep learning techniques show dramatic
performance on computer vision area, and they even out-
perform human. But it is also vulnerable to some small
perturbation called an adversarial attack. This is a prob-
lem combined with the safety of artificial intelligence, which
has recently been studied a lot. These attacks have shown
that they can fool models of image classification, semantic
segmentation, and object detection. We point out this attack
can be protected by denoise autoencoder, which is used for
denoising the perturbation and restoring the original im-
ages. We experiment with various noise distributions and
verify the effect of denoise autoencoder against adversarial
attack in semantic segmentation.
1. Introduction
A deep neural network has shown remarkable perfor-
mance in vision-related tasks such as image classification,
object detection, and semantic segmentation. With this per-
formance, deep learning technology has started to be ap-
plied to various practice areas such as a self-driving car,
health care artificial intelligence. However, according to a
recent study, deep learning models are vulnerable to well-
designed perturbation of input. These perturbations are hard
to detect via human eyes, so human can still understand ob-
jects correctly. But a deep neural network can produce com-
pletely different results than we expect. The adversary can
even make perturbation in the way they want. For instance,
they can change the image so that a deep neural network
misclassifies it as a wrong target set by them. This phe-
nomenon is important issue in terms of security and safety
of artificial intelligence. For instance, a very dangerous sce-
nario can occur in self-driving cars. Self-driving cars can
misunderstand the stop signal or misperceive the area of the
road [21, 8] . In health care, a medical diagnosis system
based on deep learning technique can misjudge the status of
the patient [9].
(a) Clean image (b) Prediction of (a)
(c) Adversarial exam-
ple
(d) Prediction of (c)
Figure 1: Adversarial attack in semantic segmentation
This perturbed image is called adversarial example or
adversarial attack. It is basically generated by using the
parameters and loss function of the victim model. And it
is called white box attack since it requires the information
of the model. But in case of no access to the model, it is
still possible to create an adversarial example because of the
property called the transferability. It allows attack on this
situation, which is called black box attack. i.e, an adversar-
ial example generated from specific model works with other
models as well. It is known that an adversarial attack works
better with a similar task. For instance, adversarial attack
on particular neural network can fool other neural networks
with different architectures[17]. With this transferable fea-
ture, an adversary can more easily fool diverse models.
Many research has tried to generate stronger adversarial
examples to attack the state-of-the-art models [18, 16, 2].
And in response to this, there has been some research ap-
proaches to make robust models against adversarial attack
[19, 14]. There were also competitions involving adversar-
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ial attack and defense in the field of image classification
[13]. Several methods for attack and defense are proposed.
However, many of the attack and defense involved in ad-
versarial examples have been limited to the problem of im-
age classification. Although there are related works which
deal with the semantic segmentation and object detection
[23, 15, 26], only attack scenarios are addressed and stud-
ies of defense scenarios for complex tasks such as semantic
segmentation are insufficient. Also, for the defense model
of the classification task, they often use simple dataset like
MNIST, CIFAR 10, which have a small resolution. There-
fore, it is needed to experiment with images which have
large resolution since more complicated images are used in
the real world. In addition, we need to study the defense
scenario of semantic segmentation since it is more practical.
For instance, in autonomous driving vehicles or medical in-
telligence, most of the scene understanding is performed
through semantic segmentation rather than classification.
In this paper, we aim to provide robust mechanisms to se-
cure semantic segmentation model from adversarial attack
To achieve that, we propose DAPAS, a denoise autoencoder
to prevent adversarial attack in semantic segmentation that
effectively removes adversarial perturbation. Since seman-
tic segmentation involves the classification of pixels, it is
important to restore the original image at the pixel level so
that the restored image gives the correct semantic segmen-
tation result. We use random noise that follows a particu-
lar distribution. We use the Gaussian distribution, Uniform
distribution, and Bimodal distribution. The adversarial at-
tack would change the pixel value of input X slightly, the
random noise could cover a variety of attack methods. For
the dataset, we use the PASCAL VOC 2012 [7] and test it
on the DeepLab V3 Plus [4] which has one of the state-of-
the-art models in the field of semantic segmentation task.
We first generate an adversarial example of DeepLab V3
Plus, and we verify that our approach is effective against
adversarial attack on semantic segmentation. As a result,
the performance of our proposed model was around 97 %
compared to the original model DeepLab V3 Plus on clean
image. In the case of an adversarial attack, the performance
of DeepLab V3 Plus dropped to about 13 % of the original
performance, but when it passed our denoise autoencoder, it
covered up to 68 % compared to the original performance.
Therefore, the method we proposed confirmed that the at-
tack is effectively defended while minimizing performance
degradation. In addition, we don’t have to retrain the seg-
mentation model. We leave the model we want to defend as
it is, and we defend the model by putting a DAPAS in front
of it.
The content of the remaining parts is as follows. We
show an overall review of related work in Section 2. And
we explain our method and show our architecture in Section
3. In Section 4, We evaluate our defense method with an
adversarial example. And the conclusion and discussion are
provided in Section 5.
2. Related Work
Szegedy et al. found the existence of perturbation that
breaks the classifier [22]. This paper presents a simple and
effective attack called Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM)
[10]. It shows small perturbation is enough to fool the clas-
sifier. [16] measures the minimum size required for the at-
tack. They give better intuition of the existence of adversar-
ial example by calculating sufficient magnitude of the per-
turbation. In addition to classification problems, [15, 26]
shows the adversarial attack on the task of the segmenta-
tion model and object detection. And [1] experiments and
analyzes the effect of the adversarial attack on the various
semantic segmentation models such as DeepLab V2 [3] and
PSPNet [27].
To counter adversarial attacks, some works trained the
model with the normal example and adversarial example
[12, 24] which is called adversarial training. During the
process of training, they generate adversarial for the train-
ing. Although it works, it depends on the particular adver-
sarial data used in the training process. For instance, [12]
shows their approach is robust in the simple attack, but not
in a more sophisticated attack. In addition, it has engineer-
ing penalty since it requires retraining the model. If it takes
longer to create an adversarial example, it will take more
time to retrain the model. Instead of using the data aug-
mentation, methods to change the model itself were also
proposed [6, 5]. They change the objective function of the
problem for obtaining the robustness. However, this ap-
proach also requires retraining the model so it costs time.
[20, 14] preprocess the image before putting in to the model.
This approach is similar to our work, but they experiment
with the image which has a small resolution like MNIST
and CIFAR series.
Currently, there is no general defense method of adver-
sarial attack. In addition, to the best of our knowledge, there
is no defense scenario of the semantic segmentation in the
context of the adversarial attack. We verify our approach is
effective against an adversarial attack in semantic segmen-
tation.
3. Adversarial Attack
Basically, all of the attacks use the gradient of data with
respect to the loss function of victim model. In this section,
we briefly review the basic method of adversarial attack.
Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM). The FGSM is
proposed by [10]. It is simple and effective attack method.
X = X +  · |sign(OX l(X, ytrue))|
Where  is a magnitude of noise and l(X, ytrue) is a loss
Figure 2: The architecture of the denoise autoencoder
with respect to the true label of the image. It adjusts input
X by adding a sign of the gradient of X. It increases the loss
function of the victim model so that the model misjudges
about the adjusted input. Since it updates input X once, it
is also called single-step method. Adversaries can update
the input in the direction they want. It decreases the loss of
the victim model with respect to the target label set by the
adversary.
X = X −  · |sign(OX l(X, ytarget))|
If the input is modified enough, the model predicts the target
which the adversary wants. In both cases, the  have the role
of the scale of the perturbation. We call the first method as
untargeted FGSM and second method as targeted FGSM.
Iterative FGSM (I-FGSM). The iterative FGSM is a
repetitive version of FGSM. it is a more powerful attack
method compared to the FGSM. It uses the following equa-
tions:
X0 = X
Xt+1 = clipX,(Xt + α · |sign(OX l(Xt, ytrue))|)
Where α is a step size for adjusting Xt , and clip func-
tion ensures that Xt ∈ (X − ,X + ) for all t. And we
choose step number as min( + 2, 4) if  ≤ 0.008, other-
wise min(+ 4, 1.24). It is also called multi-step method.
Here α is the 1 in the scale of 0 to 255 in the original paper.
We use 0.25 for the α.
As the case of targeted FGSM, the adversary can modify
the data in the way they want.
Xt+1 = clipX,(Xt − α · |sign(OX l(X, ytarget))|)
We denote this algorithm I-FGSM on this paper. Al-
though theses attack methods were introduced in the context
of image classification, the same method can be applied in
the context of semantic segmentation task. We call the first
method as an untargeted I-FGSM and second method as tar-
geted I-FGSM. We use untargeted FGSM and untargeted
I-FGSM on this paper.
4. Method
Our mechanism does not modify the semantic segmen-
tation model. We train denoise autoencoder as a preproces-
sor. And we place it in front of the semantic segmentation
model. We use pre-trained DeepLab V3 Plus for the seman-
tic segmentation model which is the state-of-the-art. In this
section, we show the architecture of denoise autoencoder,
detail of training setup and demonstrate how the denoise
autoencoder is deployed in constructing a robust semantic
segmentation model.
4.1. Dataset
We trained with PASCAL VOC 2012 data which is
widely used for the task of semantic segmentation. There
are a total of 1424 training images and 1424 verification
data [3]. The pixel value with a value from 0 to 255 was
re-scaled to change from 0 to 1. And the resolution of the
image was fixed to 553× 553.
4.2. Architecture of Denoise Autoencoder
The overall structure of the model is shown in Figure 2.
The denoise autoencoder is divided into two parts, orange-
colored encoder part, and blue-colored decoder part. While
encoder extracts the feature of the input image, the decoder
restores the input image from the extracted feature. The
encoder consists of five convolutional layers and the reso-
lution of each feature map gradually reduces by half. We
did not use max pooling or average pooling for decreasing
the resolution of the feature map. We adjust the stride of
the kernel for decreasing the resolution. In the decoder, it
also consists of five deconvolutional layers and the resolu-
tion of each feature map expands twice. And we use skip
connection to restore the details of the spatial information
of the feature maps. In other words, the features used in the
encoder were symmetrically linked to the features of the
decoder. We add features which have the same resolution.
Here we did not connect the first feature through the skip
connection, i.e input image. Since input image has noisy
information. For the activation function, we use ELU in-
stead of RELU for each layer. And we use sigmoid as the
last activation function.
4.3. Train
We use Adam optimizer, 0.0005 for learning rate. We
add random noise to the train set. And we use either clean
or noisy input. It is a little bit different from the original
framework of denoise autoencoder [25]. Since our purpose
is to also maintain the original performance in case of no
adversarial attack, we also put clean input. For random
noise, we use Gaussian distribution, Uniform distribution,
and Bimodal distribution. For the Gaussian distribution, we
set mean of zero and the standard deviation of 0.004. For
the Uniform distribution, we set the range from -0.035 to
0.035. For the Bimodal distribution, we use a mixture of
two Gaussian distributions. For each Gaussian distribution,
we set mean of -0.024 and 0.024. And we use the standard
deviation of 0.004.
4.4. Combining with semantic segmentation model
Figure 3: Overall flow of DAPAS
The created denoise autoencoder is connected to the gen-
eral model that performs semantic segmentation like Fig-
ure 4. The denoise autoencoder has the role of prepro-
cessing before the image entering the segmentation model.
Since denoise autoencoder is independent of the segmenta-
tion model, it can be located in front of any model. There-
fore it serves as a general defense mechanism.
Hence, we do not have to re-train the model we want to
defend. Besides, the random noise used in training the de-
noise autoencoder is independent of any adversarial attack,
it can defend against a variety of attack.
5. Experiment
In this section, we look at the ability of the denoise au-
toencoder to restore and then measure how the restored im-
age performs in the segmentation model DeepLab V3 Plus.
We test the results of segmentation in DeepLab V3 Plus us-
ing test data from the Pascal VOC with additional annota-
tion from SBD [11]. In adversarial attack, we assumed that
noise is not large. Because the purpose of adversarial at-
tack is not to deceive people but to deceive models. So we
limit the magnitude of the noise to 0.032 of pixel level. i.e,
it changes 3.2 % of the original pixel value. We properly
adjust the standard deviation of Gaussian distribution and
Bimodal distribution,and the range of Uniform distribution.
The details of the distribution, the evaluation metric, and the
result of experiment are summarized below.
5.1. dataset
We use a pre-trained model, which normalized the data
so we did the same for testing. In other words, the average
was subtracted and divided by the standard deviation. We
use PASCAL VOC validation set which is not used in the
process of training the denoise autoencoder. And we resize
the image as 513× 513.
5.2. Denoise Autoencoder as a restoration
(a) Clean image (b) After (a) passing
the denoise autoen-
coder
(c) Noisy image (d) After (c) passing
the denoise autoen-
coder
Figure 4: Effects of denoise autoencoder
(a) Clean image (b) Prediction of (a) (c) Ground truth
(d) adversarial example us-
ing FGSM
(e) Prediction of the FGSM (f) After pass the DAPAS (g) Prediction of the (f)
(h) adversarial example us-
ing I-FGSM
(i) Prediction of the I-
FGSM
(j) After pass the DAPAS (k) Prediction of the (j)
Figure 5: Images from adversarial attack by using FGSM and I-FGSM, images after DAPAS , and outputs for each.
We visualize the output of denoise autoencoder before
measuring the robustness against adversarial attack. Al-
though we use three different distribution for noise, we
show the case of Gaussian noise for simplicity. Since the
noise level is not much different, the results of other distri-
butions are similar. We make sure that the clean image is
well restored after denoise autoencoder as well as in case
of the noisy image since the performance on a clean image
should not be compromised. Figure 3-(a) shows the origi-
nal image, Figure 3-(b) shows the noisy image, Figure 3-(c)
shows the original image after denoise autoencoder and Fig-
ure 11 shows the noisy image after denoise autoencoder. It
is easy to see that Figure 3-(c) is more clear than Figure 3-
(d). Therefore we can intuitively expect that the reduction
ratio will be not that much.
5.3. Evaluation metric
The mean Intersection over Union (mIoU) is widely used
for evaluating the performance of semantic segmentation
[7]. And we adapt relative metric IoU Ratio for measuring
the robustness [1]. The IoU ratio on the attack is defined as
follows.
• mIoUCO : mIoU of a clean image on the original
model
• mIoUAO : mIoU of an adversarial image on the
original model
• mIoUCP : mIoU of a clean image on the proposed
model
Noise
Clean image After DAPAS
mIoU mIoU IoU ratio of reduction(%)
Gaussian
78.4
76.4 97.4
Uniform 76.4 97.4
Bimodal 76.3 97.2
Table 1: IoU ratio of reduction

FGSM I-FGSM
mIoU IoU ratio of attack (%) mIoU IoU ratio of attack (%)
0.001 50.9 64.8 50.9 64.8
0.002 44.6 56.9 34.5 44.0
0.004 40.2 51.2 24.9 31.8
0.008 37.6 48.0 19.0 24.2
0.016 37.1 47.3 15.3 19.6
0.032 38.0 48.5 10.3 13.1
Table 2: IoU ratio of attack

Gaussian Uniform Bimodal
mIoU IoU ratio of robust (%) mIoU IoU ratio of robust (%) mIoU IoU ratio of robust (%)
0.001 69.7 88.9 69.2 88.2 69.8 89.1
0.002 64.8 82.6 63.9 81.5 64.9 82.8
0.004 58.3 74.3 57.2 72.9 58.6 74.7
0.008 51.8 66.0 50.8 64.8 52.0 66.4
0.016 46.5 59.2 45.7 58.2 46.7 59.6
0.032 43.3 55.2 42.7 54.5 43.4 55.3
Table 3: IoU ratio of robust on FGSM

Gaussian Uniform Bimodal
mIoU IoU ratio of robust (%) mIoU IoU ratio of robust (%) mIoU IoU ratio of robust (%)
0.001 69.7 88.9 69.2 88.2 69.8 89.1
0.002 64.5 82.2 63.3 80.8 64.8 82.6
0.004 61.4 78.3 59.7 76.1 61.7 78.7
0.008 59.1 75.4 57.1 72.9 59.7 76.1
0.016 57.7 73.6 55.5 70.8 58.3 74.3
0.032 53.3 68.0 50.2 64. 53.9 68.7
Table 4: IoU ratio of robust on I-FGSM
• mIoUAP : mIoU of an adversarial image on the
proposed model
IoU ratio of attack =
mIoUAO
mIoUCO
IoU ratio of robust =
mIoUAP
mIoUCO
This is a metric that shows the performance is compared
to the original model performance. And we measure the
mIoU ratio of the original model to the proposed model to
calculate the reduction on a clean image as the following.
IoU ratio of reduction =
mIoUCP
mIoUCO
5.4. Analysis of results
The performance reduction due to the denoise autoen-
coder was as low as around 3% for all three distributions.
And in the situation of attack, we verify that denoise autoen-
coders are effective against in adversarial attack. Among
the three denoise autoencoders, using the Bimodal distribu-
tion has the best performance in the scenario of the attack.
Figures 11 and 21 show the results. We can see that the seg-
mentation output is weird when the FGSM and the I-FGSM
are applied. In addition, We can see that the I-FGSM is less
noisy than the FGSM, but the segmentation results show
that the attack was more effective in I-FGSM (Fig 14, Fig
18). And after passing the denoise autoencoder, it success-
fully defends on both cases. Table 2 shows IoU ratio of
attack. The I-FGSM is more powerful than FGSM. When
Figure 6: IoU ratio of attack on FGSM Figure 7: IoU ratio of attack on I-FGSM
the  is 0.008, 0.0016 and 0.0032, IoU ratio of attack on
FGSM are similar. But in case of I-FGSM, IoU ratio of
attack significantly drops to 24.2%, 21.9% and 12.0%. Ta-
ble 3 and Table 4 shows IoU ratio of robust on FGSM and
I-FGSM. Table 3 and Table 4 show IoU ratio of robust on
FGSM and I-FGSM. Comparing the two tables, IoU ratio
of robust on I-FGSM is larger than IoU ratio of robust on
FGSM although the attack is more effective on I-FGSM.
Gaussian distribution We use the small standard devia-
tion of Gaussian distribution since we want to check the per-
formance depends on the noise distribution, so we use the
mean of 0 and the standard deviation of 0.004. Although it
is also effective, the performance is middle among the three
denoise autoencoders.
Uniform distribution We give the range from -0.035 to
0.035 of Uniform distribution since the maximum magni-
tude of adversarial perturbation is 0.032. Among the three
distribution, denoise autoencoder using the Uniform distri-
bution has the best performance in terms of reduction. It
shows 96.9% IoU ratio of reduction. Therefore, it only de-
creased by 3.1 % compared to the original performance.
In case of the attack scenario, it shows worst performance
compared to other denoise autoencoders.
Bimodal distribution For most cases, denoise autoen-
coder trained with Bimodal distribution noise shows the
best performance among tree distribution. Since the adver-
sarial attack would add or subtract noise of fixed size, we
use the noise following the Bimodal distribution using the
two Gaussian distributions like Figure 8. Each Gaussian
distribution has the mean of -0.24 and 0.24, the standard
deviation of the 0.004.
Figure 8: Bimodal distribution using two Gaussian distribu-
tions
The IoU reduction is 97.2 %, which is the worst among
three distributions, but the difference is small. And in case
of attack, the performance was the best.
6. Conclusion
We verify the denoise autoencoder is effective in defend-
ing against adversarial attack in the context of the semantic
segmentation task. We also confirm that the performance
varies slightly depending on what kind of noise distribution
the denoise autoencoder produces in the input. We also be-
lieve that since our denoise autoencoder is independent of
particular attack when designing the denoise autoencoder,
this approach is available not only in the semantic segmen-
tation task but also in the areas of classification and object
detection. The design of a more detailed and careful de-
noise autoencoder against adversarial attack remains a fu-
ture study.
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